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PEACE EDUCATION: EXPLORING SOME 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
James Smith Page 
 
Abstract 
 
Peace education has been accepted as an important aspect of social education over the past 
three decades, although as yet there been little attention within the critical literature and 
within official documents towards developing and articulating philosophical foundations 
for peace education. This essay explores the possibility that such foundations might be 
located within 1) virtue ethics, 2) consequentialist ethics, 3) aesthetic ethics, 4) 
conservative political ethics, and 5) the ethics of care. Each of the above is important, 
although ultimately a thorough basis for peace education can only be established through an 
integrative approach to the above foundations, an approach that mirrors much of the 
emphasis within UN and UNESCO initiatives to encourage a culture of peace. The 
importance of peace education is often accepted as given by those committed to peace 
education, although the development and articulation of the philosophical rationale for 
peace education remains an important task for the future. [Translations of this Abstract in 
German, French, Spanish and Russian are provided within the published version of the 
article. The page-breaks within the published article are indicated as numerals within 
brackets]. [3/4] 
 
Article 
 
The Current Status of Peace Education 
 
It seems reasonable to say that peace education is now officially accepted as an important 
aspect of social education. Over the past three decades there has been a growing corpus of 
critical literature within this field, including contributions by writers such as Adelson 
(2000), Brock-Utne (1985, 1989), Burns and Aspelagh (1983, 1996). Cellitti (1998), 
Galtung (1975, 1984), Gordon and Grob (1987), Haavelsrud (1975, 1981), Harris (1988, 
1996a, 1996b), Harris and Forcey (1999), Henderson (1973), Hicks (1988), Hutchinson 
(1996), Jackson (1992), Kaman and Harris (2000), Mack (1984), Marks (1983), Markusen 
and Harris (1984), McCarthy (2002), Okamoto (1984), O’Reilly (1993), Page (2000), 
Raviv, Oppenheimer and Bar-Tal (1999), Ray (1988), Reardon (1989, 1997), Rees (2000), 
Rivage-Seul (1987), Salomon and Nevo (2002), Thomas and Klare (1989), Toh and 
Floresca-Cawagas (1990), and Zars, Wilson and Phillips (1985). Interestingly, the focus in 
the literature in recent years has tended to include the personal as well as global aspects of 
peace education. There has also been an increasing emphasis on peace as a human right. 
However one intriguing and lingering lacuna within the critical literature has been the 
failure to develop and expound systematic philosophical foundations for peace education. 
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This lacuna is also evident in the considerable international documentation dealing with the 
importance of peace education.  The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (1945), 
the Constitution of UNESCO (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1949) all contain statements undergirding the importance of peace education.  Since then 
the enunciation of the importance of peace education has become more explicit within 
international pronouncements and declarations. Peace education has been affirmed within 
official documents of UNESCO (1974, 1980, 1994/5, 1996), UNICEF (1996, 1999), the 
UN General Assembly (1978, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2002), and the [4/5] Hague Appeal for 
Peace (1999). Moreover, there is considerable institutional commitment to peace education. 
At last count, UNESCO (2000) listed 580 peace research and training institutes around the 
world.  One could argue that such an international commitment presents or represents a 
legitimacy for peace education, as the importance of a commitment to peace education has 
been repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations and by the action of societies and 
governments in establishing peace research and training. Nevertheless it remains that case 
that within such a commitment there is no well developed philosophical rational for peace 
education, other than perhaps a general deontological notion that peace education is 
something humanity ought to be committed to.   
 
 The current philosophical approach to peace education within the critical literature and by 
international organizations might be described as being almost a fideistic one. By this, I 
mean that it is taken for granted that it is important to believe in peace and to believe in 
peace education.  Such an approach may be understandable, although it nevertheless does 
not serve to provide or advance any fundamental educational rationale for peace education. 
Ilan Gur-Ze’ev wryly suggests (2001:315) that this lack of theoretical coherence or 
philosophical elaboration for peace education is not always viewed as a bad thing, as “at 
times philosophical work is understood as unnecessary, artificial, or even dangerous for this 
educational cause”.  Gur-Ze’ev develops a critique of peace education as justification or 
rationalization of what is often a violent status quo, what Gur-Ze’ev calls hegemonic 
violence.  The very fact that Gur-Ze’ev makes such a critique underscores the importance 
of exploring the potential foundations for peace education. What follows is an outline of 
five possible areas of philosophical foundation for peace education, namely, virtue ethics, 
consequentialist ethics, aesthetic ethics, conservative political ethics, and the ethics of care. 
 
Virtue Ethics and Peace Education 
 
Firstly, let us examine virtue ethics and peace education. Virtue ethics has been undergoing 
something of a renaissance in recent decades, and there has been particular interest in the 
relationship between virtue ethics and education. There are many ethicists who have been 
prominent in this revival, although two of the most influential have been Alasdair McIntyre 
(1985) and Rosalind Hursthouse (1999). There is much support for a virtue ethics in world 
religions, and throughout much of human history ethics has been virtue ethics. Two of the 
standard historical sources for virtue ethics remain the work of Aristotle (1984) and 
Thomas Aquinas (1963-1975). It is noteworthy also that there is much popular writing that 
implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) works upon a virtue ethics basis. There is much to be 
said for the suggestion that the revival of virtue ethics reflects an ethical response that 
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empowers the individual or that seeks to empower the individual, at a time when social 
systems tend to dictate that the individual is of no significance. 
 
It is probably fair to say that the revival of educational interest in virtue ethics relates to 
concerns over a perceived loss of a public sense of social civility, perceived increases in 
levels of personal aggression and violence, and a perceived [5/6] diminution of an overall 
commitment to ethical conduct. The arguable virtue ethics basis for peace education is 
related to the emphasis within virtue ethics on the importance of the development of 
character or virtue.  If we agree that education is concerned with the development of 
character, then an important element of character development is to develop and encourage 
harmonious and co-operative relations between individuals.  Similarly, a fundamental aim 
of education should be to develop the character and personality that will value harmonious 
and co-operative relations between individuals. In a sense, if we say that respect for others 
and active non-violence are virtues, then it follows, from a virtues ethics approach to 
education, that education should aim to encourage and develop those virtues. 
 
The interesting point about a virtue ethics approach to peace education is that this approach 
has much in common with the theory of intrapersonal peace, and especially as developed 
within the theory of nonviolent action.  Within his life and writings, Mohandas Gandhi 
continually emphasized the importance of nonviolent action based upon the inner 
commitment of the actor to truth.  Indeed within Gandhian thought nonviolence is thought 
of as truth-force or satyagraha. Peace was not a set of actions or even a state of affairs.  
Peace is a character orientation on the part of the individual. Similarly virtue ethics 
emphasizes not action as such but rather the state of the actor.  It is significant that virtue 
ethics is sometimes referred to as agent-based ethics: within both virtue ethics and within 
much peace theory it is who you are which is of prime importance. What we do derives its 
significance from who we are. 
 
Consequentialist Ethics and Peace Education 
 
Consequentialist ethics is another emergent area of ethical theory that may serve as an area 
of foundation for peace education. Consequentialism is the ethical doctrine that the 
morality of any action is to be assessed by the consequences of that action. There are 
variations of consequentialism such as act and rule consequentialism, although undeniably 
the most identifiable form of consequentialism is utilitarian philosophy, in which the 
consequences (and worth) of actions are determined by the degree of overall well-being or 
happiness resulting from those actions. The utilitarian tradition is perhaps best represented 
through the writing of Jeremy Bentham (1970) and John Stuart Mill (1877).  
Consequentialist/utilitarian ethics have been emerging for some time, although it is still 
arguable that such ethics are implicitly the ethics of a modern mass society, in that it is only 
with the rise of democratic theory that the well-being of the greatest number of people 
would be considered relevant to ethics and it is only a modern scientific society which can 
measure that well-being. It is interesting that so few contemporary philosophers claim the 
title of consequentialism, possibly due in part to the situation so much of the operation of 
modern societies and political structures are already undergirded (at least in theory) by such 
an ethical philosophy. 
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It is arguable that consequentialist ethics basis for peace education is the most obvious, and 
most writing on the importance of peace education or education for peace implicitly works 
on a consequentialist basis.  The basis for a consequentialist ethics approach to peace 
education goes something like this: what we teach and how we teach has an effect in 
forming the sort of society we live in.  This proposition is not always articulated, although 
in some ways is quite self-evident.  If there were not some implied hope of betterment [6/7] 
through education and teaching, then we would not be expending the effort in education 
and teaching.  Conversely, what we fail to teach and our failure in how we teach also has an 
impact in the type of world we will live in.  From a perspective of peace education, 
therefore, it is important to teach, both through content and example, that there are 
alternatives to conflict and injustice.  In particular, from a perspective of peace education, it 
is important to teach of the unnecessary suffering resulting from war and resulting from 
social injustice.  If what we teach and how one teaches has consequences, it follows that 
one of the aims of education therefore should be to encourage students to think about the 
type of world we would want to have, and to empower them to create such a world. 
 
Thus when we say that there is a danger of nuclear war and that we need to teach about this 
danger, the assumption within such a proposition is a consequentialist one, namely, that by 
teaching young people about nuclear war they might in the future make political decisions 
to move away from reliance on nuclear weapons and perhaps also to become committed to 
nuclear disarmament. The interesting point about a consequentialist ethics approach to 
peace education is that this does find links in other forms of approaches to curriculum and 
education.  What is sometimes known as social reconstructionism works on the basis that 
we can and should aim to reform society through the educational process.  The more recent 
emphasis on critical literacy is undergirded by an assumption that individuals with critical 
insight are more able to challenge and ultimately change the (unjust) social structures of 
society.  Critics might suggest that all such approaches are highly political.  Advocates of 
such approach would say that there are not so much political as moral. If there is social 
danger we have a responsibility to educate about this danger so that future generations 
might do something to avert the danger.        
 
Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education 
 
A third possible philosophical basis for peace education is within the area of aesthetics, and 
in particular within aesthetic ethics. Traditionally, aesthetic ethics is most often contrasted 
with moral ethics, substantially due to the influential Kantian insistence that moral action 
must be counter-inclinational – the moral act is only that act which is performed with 
regard to duty alone, and not out of sympathy. However, in recent years the separation 
between the moral and the aesthetic has been challenged, and many writers have agued for 
a rehabilitation of the unity of aesthetics and ethics.  The proponents of such a rehabilitation 
include Heesoon Bai, Marcia Eaton, Josef Früchtl, André Leverkühn, Martin Seel, and 
Jean-Pierre Wils, although arguably there are precursor elements to an aesthetic ethics in 
the writing of those such as John Dewey (1960), Friedrich Schiller (2000), Albert 
Schweitzer (1923a, 1923b, 1931) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (2001). Aesthetic ethics in a 
modern sense refers to actions based upon judgments about what is beautiful or desirable, 
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or in a more general sense, about what is considered to be of value.  The line between 
discourse on aesthetic judgments and value judgments is a blurred one: in some ways when 
we talk about [7/8] aesthetics we are also talking about values and what we consider 
valuable and worthwhile.  
 
One can maintain that all of education is undergirded by aesthetic judgments or judgments 
as to what is beautiful and desirable. If we believe that peace, that is, harmonious and co-
operative relations between individuals and societies, is a beautiful thing, a valuable thing 
in itself, then we should not be ashamed in having this as a stated objective within the 
curriculum. We should not reticent or ashamed at articulating the importance of peace 
education.  Interestingly, the application of aesthetic ethics to education finds resonance in 
the influential writing of Richard Stanley Peters. Peters would be not normally considered 
as a proponent of aesthetic ethics. Nevertheless, the importance of the aesthetic dimension 
of education is a recurrent theme in the writing of Peters (1964, 1966). Moreover, the idea 
of education as an initiation into worthwhile activities, prominent within the work of Peters, 
assumes that there are specific activities that are intrinsically valuable or worthwhile, and 
that the act of valuing something intrinsically is important.  My contention is that peace, or 
the practice of peaceful relationships, ought to be regarded as a worthwhile activity into 
which students ought validly to be initiated. 
 
Opponents of an aesthetic ethics approach to education might well suggest that notions of 
beauty or value should have no place within education, and certainly not within any rational 
or scientific approach to education. However I would argue such an objection represents a 
misunderstanding of the proper functioning of rationality and science.  Rationality 
functions in concord with our aesthetic judgments.  Similarly within science we continually 
make implicit judgments about what is beautiful or desirable.  The most obvious aesthetic 
judgment which undergirds the physical sciences is that the universe is beautiful.  There are 
no doubt instrumental advantages from the physical sciences.  However if it were not for 
the assumption that the universe is beautiful, then there would be little reason for studying 
physical sciences, and especially such sciences as astronomy.  My argument is that peace 
also should be seen as something beautiful and valuable.   Ultimately there can be no such 
entity as value-free education.  The question is whether the values that are expressed within 
education are defensible.  In this case peace does seem a value and an entity that is 
defensible, and defensible specifically on the grounds of an aesthetic ethics.  
 
Conservative Political Ethics and Peace Education 
 
The fourth potential basis for peace education is within emergent conservative political 
theory and ethics, and in particular aspects of conservative political thought, such as an 
aversion to violent social change, an aversion to a priori reasoning, and an emphasis on the 
importance of a strong and stable nation-state. The notion of conservative political theory is 
at surface a contradictory one, as writers within what might be called a conservative 
intellectual tradition tend to be antagonistic to political ideology as such. The most 
influential thinker [8/9] within the conservative political tradition has been Edmund Burke 
(1969), although more recently the writing of Michael Oakeshott (1962) and Anthony 
Quinton (1978) has also been highly influential. It is significant that within the work of all 
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three of the above there is not an absolute opposition to social change as such, but rather a 
commitment to gradual and orderly (we might say peaceful) change.  Such a vision is 
entirely consistent with the vision of peaceful social transformation through peace 
education.  
 
If we examine the three emphases within conservative thought, that is, aversion to violent 
social change, aversion to a priori reasoning and emphasis on a strong and stable nation-
state, I believe there are strong linkages to the notion of peace and the project of peace 
education within each of these.  The conservative aversion to violent social change finds an 
obvious resonance in peace theory and education.  Indeed one can say that both peace 
advocates and conservatives share a common interest in peaceful social change.  Peaceful 
social change generally (although not always) means orderly social change.  This is why 
conservative political theory generally emphasizes continuity with the past and with past 
experience, as without such continuity social change cannot be orderly. Similarly, without 
order and structures, such as the nation-state, there is all the more potential for violence. 
Individuals and societies need not be violent. Nevertheless, humankind will remain 
ultimately always imperfect, and structures need to be in place to cover that contingency. 
 
Each of the above three aspects of conservative political ethics can be argued to be highly 
problematic. The aversion to violent social change can be argued to reflect an opposition to 
all social change, and a commitment to the status quo.  Certainly that is the popular 
understanding of conservatism. The aversion to a priori reasoning and the notion of the 
human imperfectability can be taken as an aversion to all ideology and vision, which again 
is not necessarily the case within conservative political theory. I would argue that within 
conservative political theory one can have even a utopian vision of a peaceful society, 
although within conservative political theory there is an emphasis that the implementation 
of this vision should be an orderly one. One can argue that a commitment to the nation-state 
within conservative political theory is not consistent with the aims of peace education, 
given that war is a phenomenon linked with the nation-state, and one of the emphases 
within peace education is to pose alternatives to nationalism and the nation-state. However 
the above is not necessarily a contrast. The statist emphasis within conservative political 
ethics is on a stable rather than a totalitarian nation-state. Such an emphasis does not 
preclude change (through such measures as education) towards acceptance of larger 
collectivities, be this in terms of international co-operation or even international 
government. Properly understood, political conservatism is not necessarily opposed to 
change. The emphasis is merely that the change should be a peaceful one.   
 
The Ethics of Care and Peace Education 
 
The final philosophical basis for peace education examined within this essay is within the 
emergent ethics of care. The ethics of care is usually associated with the writing of Carol 
Gilligan (1982, 1995), Nel Noddings (1984, 1992, 1995) [9/10] and Sara Ruddick (1989), 
who have emphasized the importance of the discovery or re-discovery of a feminine or 
caring perspective in ethics.  My own contention is that it is important not to limit the ethics 
of care as a specifically feminine ethics, but rather to articulate a universal ethics of care. It 
is not merely women who are naturally caring, but, properly understood, both women and 
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men. The work of Sara Ruddick is especially relevant for peace education, in that Ruddick 
attempts to develop a philosophical basis for a politics of peace through the notion and 
practice of maternal thinking. I would prefer to refer to the importance of parenting, 
emphasizing the importance of both fathering and mothering in the nurturing process. 
Nonetheless, however we frame it, the important point of the ethics of care is that nurturing 
(caring) ought to be the dominant guiding principle in how we act towards others. 
 
One of the specific emphases within an ethics of care is that actions should be relationship 
based rather than based upon principles and perceptions of what is just.  Thus in what we 
do we should concentrate on value such as nurturing and kindness rather than on rights and 
duties.  The discourse of rights and duties invites the question of how those rights and 
duties ought to be enforced. The notions of rights and duties are subtly linked to power and 
domination, and to enforcement and coercion. In some ways the ethics of care is very 
reminiscent of situationalist ethics. Within situationalist ethics the emphasis is that in 
deciding how to act in any situation one should act out of an agapeistic or altruistic concern 
for the other.  In Gandhian thought this concern for the other is expressed through the 
notion of ahisma, or love-force. This concern for the other therefore should be the guiding 
principle and should override all over principles of what is moral or right. 
 
It is not too difficult to see the potential connection between the ethics of care and 
education for peace. Peace is ultimately about relationships. This includes relationships 
between individuals and relationships between collectivities such as nation-states. On a 
deeper level, peace also concerns the relationship of a person with one’s own self and the 
relationship of humanity with the environment. However the connection does not end there. 
An important dimension of the causation of war and conflict is an insistence and 
concentration upon national rights and national justice. An ethics of care does not suggest 
that national rights and national justice are not important, but rather caring for individuals is 
more important.  Peace education itself is also about relationships. Put quite simply, we 
learn within the context of and from relationships, and peace education is concerned with 
establishing a nurturing and supportive relationships.  Curriculum content is important.  
However what is far more important is the relationship between the teacher and the student, 
and the institution and the student, within all levels of education.  Ultimately it is through  
nurturing and supportive relationships that we can say that individuals can learn peace.  
 
Future Directions 
 
The philosophical foundations outlined here invite further discussion, but it has not been 
within the scope of this essay to develop any one of them in any detail. These philosophical 
foundations, however, should be regard as [10/11] complementary, and  any rationale for 
peace education should be based upon an integrative approach to the above foundations. 
Such an integrative approach reflects very much the integrative approach to the culture of 
peace, as articulated within the UN General Assembly Resolution 53/243 of September 
1999, under the title ‘Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace’, and as 
developed in recent years by UNESCO.  The culture of peace is a multifaceted 
phenomenon, involving attitudes, values and behaviours, and engaging a range of precepts. 
It follows that if peace and certainly a culture of peace is a multifaceted entity, then the 
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philosophical approach to providing a rational for peace education can also be expected to 
be multifaceted and diverse. 
 
For those committed to peace and to peace education, the question of exactly why we 
should be committed to this endeavour seems a self-evident truth.  The ever-present threat 
of global or imperial warfare and the continuing injustice of the maldistribution and 
exploitation of global resources all seem quite obvious.  On a local scale, the problems of 
violence and a culture of violence within personal relationships also seem quite obvious.  
However it is precisely the overwhelming nature of the above phenomena that underscores 
the importance of developing a thorough rationale for what we hope to achieve through 
peace education.  We need to be able to articulate not only what should be done within 
education for peace, but why this should be done.  Hopefully this is an area where there 
will be further debate and discussion in the future. 
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